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This article describes the challenges of data governance in terms of the broader
framework of knowledge commons governance, an institutional approach to governing shared knowledge, information, and data resources. Knowledge commons
governance highlights the potential for effective community- and collective-based
governance of knowledge resources. The article focuses on key concepts within
the knowledge commons framework rather than on specific law and public policy questions, directing the attention of researchers and policymakers to critical
inquiry regarding relevant social groups and relevant data “things.” Both concepts
are key tools for effective data governance.

1. Introduction
Law offers no single or simple answer to the problems and opportunities afforded by data. For data scientists, commercial entities,
and policymakers which may ask, “how should data be generated, or
stored, or transferred, or used?,” this article offers a short set of basic
tools to use in developing suitable possibilities for governance and
ethical practice. This is neither a detailed list of prescriptions nor an
inventory or checklist of remedies for current controversies. Instead,
the article offers two essential tools for imagining how to advance
effective data governance. One consists of identifying and describing relevant social groups in which governance frameworks may
be embedded. Two consists of identifying and describing relevant
resources, or things, whose form and flow will contribute substantially to the welfare effects of the relevant data governance systems.
In part the aim of the article is to broaden relevant perspectives. Preparing the article followed a prompt to consider governing and regulating “data markets” relative to innovation, growth, and societal progress. That premise risks cutting off the inquiry prematurely. Markets,
including regulated markets, are often too simplistic as descriptions
of relevant problems or solutions, given what is almost self-evidently
a complex challenge. State or government control or supply, as the
usual alternatives to market regulation of problematic social phenomena, are likewise often too simplistic. Understanding data requires a
broader view, adding the concept of commons governance to these
two, in which “commons” embraces data sharing in some collectively
managed or governed context. Data are almost always significant or
valuable because they are shared.
* Michael J. Madison is Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. This paper was presented at the workshop ‘Governing
Data as a Resource’ organized at Tilburg University in November 2019.

In part the aim of the article is to provide a basic toolkit that is not
tethered to immediate needs and that is adaptable and evolutionary
in appropriate ways, as data governance questions challenge us to
extend our imaginations. Some of this challenge is old. Along with
researchers and industry, regulators and ethicists long ago began to
confront the speed, breadth, and scale of the raw computing power
now available at comparatively modest expense, so-called Big Data,
and the rise of disciplines combined under the title “data science.”
Law and regulation have grappled with widely-deployed artificial intelligence (AI) systems, which feed on massive supplies of data.
What is new, and what calls for newly-flexible modes of thinking and
practicing, is the apparent demise of human comprehensibility at
the center of technology design and deployment. Computing speed,
scale, and autonomous execution of networked computer systems
today operate in ways that effectively embody the absence of meaningful limits on the humans’ capacity to discern patterns in data and to draw
inferences from them.
That concern is linked to virtually every area of human endeavor and
more. Data undergirds both the “Internet of Things,” material objects
and environmental contexts in which networked sensors and actuators are embedded, and the “Internet of Bodies,” in which connected
devices are attached to or ingested by human beings.1 The influences
of data are seen in a growing number of techno-social systems, from
manufacturing to health to politics.2 One can imagine our data-saturated environment as a three-sided blend of the conceptual contri1
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butions of Claude Shannon as to information theory,3 Alan Turing as
to computability,4 and Manuel Castells as to flows of power in the
network society.5

That apparently simple distinction is fraught with complexity. Breaking down that complexity is the function of the rest of this article, in
Sections 3, 4, and 5 below, describing a governance toolkit.

To render these broader issues in more tractable terms, data governance asks more mundane questions: How do we get more data?
Better data? More useful data? How do we control or limit data
generation, or data distribution? How do we prevent or limit harms
associated with data acquisition or retention? How do we increase,
improve, or optimize social or economic value associated with data?
How do we ensure that data are preserved appropriately, or made
available for access appropriately?

To render the toolkit comprehensible beyond the corridors and
conference rooms of regulators and lawyers, the tools are conceptual
rather than doctrinal. A conceptual approach avoids entanglement
in disciplinary debates. In both descriptive and prescriptive senses,
law has wrestled with the character of its basic approach to questions
posed by knowledge and information, including data. One might
start with issues of trade and commerce; or intellectual property
and monopoly. One might focus instead on equity, autonomy, and
dignity. A more integrative view would begin at a higher level of generality, asking whether regulatory challenges pose questions that are
fundamentally private, including questions of contract (obligation)
and tort, or fundamentally public, including questions of constitutional order and administrative law.

Lurking close by are related questions about data governance in the
context of specific sectors, industries, and fields. What is the role of
data governance relative to personal privacy, employment, finance,
national security, public administration, public safety, health and
medicine, education, transportation, arts and entertainment, and
more?

In sum, data governance must be able to accommodate both the
broadest data-related questions asked above and also their context-specific applications. Because of that breadth, this article teases
out arguments related to foundational questions of data sharing,
rather than responding to the litany of questions just identified as
“mundane” or sector-specific.

The article steers clear of such classification questions. It does not
explore the details of specific legal systems or questions of legal
rights and stakeholder interests. Instead, it situates questions of legal
rule and governance strategy in the context of two distinctive concerns: what about groups, and what about things? Data-as-form and
data-as-flow state two responses to a basic problem that data governance should address. It should address them, as an initial matter, by
examining data governance as a species of institutional governance,
and specifically knowledge commons governance. Section 3 below
addresses that topic in greater detail.

The article begins with a distinction between data form and data flow.
This point is primarily descriptive. It has to do with what we focus on
rather than simply on what we find. Both as a technical construct and
as a social one, data appear to have a quantum character, in loosely
metaphorical terms, meaning that data exhibit multiple and seemingly contradictory attributes. In any governance context, a critical and
basic problem is: which attributes matter?

The article likewise avoids undue reliance on the usual “either/or”
questions that arise when law meets technology and when law meets
information, such as individual rights vs. institutions and organizations, and/or the state. Security and stability vs. innovation and
opportunity. Exclusivity vs. openness. And so forth. Those are proper
governance concerns, and critically exploring groups and things helps
us see how to advance them in specific and systematic ways.

At times, data seem thing-like, a fixed object or objects capable of
exclusive ownership and control and subject to regulation as if it were
an artifact. That characterization of data-as-form seems most apt
when data and datasets are subject to commodification and commercialization efforts.

But groups and things do something more. They open pathways into
emerging research, scholarship, and (critically) experience that teach
about a middle ground, in between markets and states, which is
broad, useful, and too often overlooked, though it cannot be a panacea or a perfect solution. That middle ground is knowledge commons,
which means social groups operating in structured ways relative to
shared data.

All the while, in almost all settings, understanding that we are sharing
data, almost all of the time.

At other times, and sometimes even at the same time, data seem
wave-like, fluid, continuously evolving, even moving, aggregations of
information that have power or effect by virtue of their scale or density on an ongoing basis rather than at a single moment. That characterization of data-as-flow seems most apt when data and datasets are
parts of research programs and are put to other public uses.
In one sense data appear to be “private goods” and in another sense
data appear to be “public goods,”6 but that distinction can be overstated. Data are not always or necessarily “goods” of any sort.
The initial point is that the aims of data governance and regulation
begin with exploring and describing both what data “is” and what
data “ought to be,” not in ontological terms, but in social terms,
framed by data-as-form or data-as-flow. Section 2 expands on this.
3
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Care must be taken with the language of commons and with what
the language signifies. This is an argument for nuanced governance
of data as a shared resource rather than for any hasty or wholesale
abandonment of private interests, markets, or even the state. This
is also an argument for an ecological and evolutionary perspective on
data and data governance, a perspective that includes accounts of
the roles of different actors, agents, and resources in producing both
productive and unproductive outcomes of data-related systems. The
word “commons” evokes precisely such a system-level perspective.7
The discussion of knowledge commons leads, in Sections 5 and 6,
into the article’s focus on two critical concepts: social groups, and
things. These are high-level but nonetheless fundamental topics when
investigating effective institutional governance of shared resources,
such as data. And with those concepts, the article offers an introductory guide to fundamental data governance questions for the benefit
of policymakers; institution and organization designers, builders,
7
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and managers; and researchers and others who wish to find an initial
hand-hold in this complex area.

2. The Foundations of Data Pluralism
2.1 Data as Form, Data as Flow
It is a fiction that data “just is” (or “just are”), despite the fact that
the word “data” itself derives from Latin for “given.” Data are mined,
produced, constructed, collected, prepared, cleaned, scrubbed, processed, analyzed, combined, sold, stored, and shared, all with explicit
or implicit reliance on interpretive theories and models.8
Many metaphors appear in that sentence, some more helpful, some
of them less so. All of them, in one way or another, suggest the
static character of data. In that sense, data are things; or objects; or
commodities. Data are fixed items and collections of information,
documenting observations about the world. By implication data are
scarce (metaphorically speaking) and valuable. Data-as-form captures
the metaphorical instinct to treat data as things, or as a thing.
Metaphors are as inescapable in law as they are elsewhere in social
life. By allowing us to describe one (less familiar) phenomenon in
terms of another (more familiar) phenomenon, metaphors both
describe our thinking processes and promote understanding. If we
want to solve a problem, we must capture the problem in its full
scope and character. At their best, metaphors are tools for doing that.
Yet metaphors are heuristics, and like all heuristics, they have their
limitations and capacities to mislead. Data-as-form is, in this sense,
incomplete.
One of the most popular umbrella metaphors for data is “the new
oil.” The Economist, a magazine, invoked that metaphor with the
headline, “The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but
data,” alluding to the ubiquity of data, the quantity of data, its value
as both commodity and as social and technical lubricant, and the
associated economic value and market power of firms that deal in
data.9 The scholarly literature tends to join in the allusion.10
“Data as [the new] oil” can be misleading. Oil is tangible, and oil
reserves are depletable. In most senses, data are intangible, and
pools or collections of data are not depletable. More recently, The
Economist has invoked a competing metaphor, “data as sunlight,”
signifying the fundamentally open character that data have, or should
have.11
But some of the implications of the “oil” metaphor may be helpful. Oil is important and valuable partly because of its commodity
character (oil in barrels rather than in untapped pools), but also partly
because of its “infrastructural” qualities, in that it can be directed
to numerous applications, with diverse value and values. Oil moves
and flows, literally. Data are “flow” in related senses. Like oil, it is
produced via complex technical processes. It can be “pooled” or
8

9

10

11

TechReg 2020

Tools for Data Governance

Sabina Leonelli, ‘Data Governance Is Key to Interpretation: Reconceptualizing Data in Data Science’ (2019) Harvard Data Science Review https://hdsr.
mitpress.mit.edu/pub/4ovhpe3v accessed 7 February 2020.
The Economist, ‘The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but
Data,’ 6 May 2017 https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/theworlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.
Dawn E Holmes, Big Data: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University
Press 2017); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A
Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt 2013).
The Economist, ‘Digital Plurality: Are Data More Like Oil or Sunlight?,’ 20
February 2020 https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/20/
are-data-more-like-oil-or-sunlight.

dis-aggregated. It can be a commodity itself. It lubricates social and
technical process. It can be a vital component of numerous other
technical and commercial applications. Data-as-flow captures the
metaphorical instinct to look at data’s fluid attributes.
Related tensions between data as form and data as flow are suggested by recent efforts by industry to clarify the meanings of
metaphors such as “data lake” and “data warehouse” in describing
modes of aggregating and managing data resources.12 A “data lake”
may combine data from multiple sources, suggesting flows of data; a
“data warehouse” may organize data from a single source, suggesting
a well-structured form.
These are not rigid characterizations. One should not be misled by
the description of data in metaphorical terms. The key point, illustrated by the necessity of metaphor, is that data are simultaneously
form and flow. No one, single, correct description of data exists on
which we may ground some correct regulatory system. The present,
massive moment in computing history, exposing the gap between
human cognitive capabilities and computing capabilities, calls for
intellectual and pragmatic humility and pluralism.
In that respect, it is important to amend the suggestion in the Introduction that data governance should build on systems perspectives
on the origins and functions of data. Systems theory typically teaches
a distinction between a resource system, sometimes referred to as a
stock, and resource units, sometimes referred to as flows. The political scientist Elinor Ostrom, introducing her research on commons
for natural resources, distinguished between fisheries and fish.13 That
distinction is most sustainable where biophysical attributes determine the identities and boundaries of the stock and the units. For
data, biophysical attributes typically must give way to characterization
and interpretation by humans, including differente modes of technology implementation . A systems perspective is still appropriate,
even critical, as this article argues below. But identifying the relevant
attributes of the system must be part of governance processes, rather
than a lead-in to a governance processes.14
Three concrete contexts offer illustrations, before the article moves
ahead to discussions of governance and resources more broadly, how
current law, public policy, and practice rely on data-as-form and dataas-flow as fundamental framing devices. The illustrations are chosen
because of the different respects in which they expose fundamental
attributes of data in context. Here as elsewhere in this article, attention is drawn to concepts rather than to debates of the moment.

2.2 Copyright and Data
The first is copyright law. Both in the US and in Europe, data and
databases as such are subject either to no copyright protection (data
lie in the public domain) or to minimal or thin copyright protection.
In the US, the Supreme Court opinion that holds that copyrightable
works must reflect at least a modicum of “creativity.”15 Logically-structured collections of facts and data almost always do not. European
copyright recognizes copyright in works that reflect the author’s own
12
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intellectual creation.16 In practice that question is usually the “originality” of the work rather than the author’s skill and labor. In cases
involving collections of facts and data, originality has often been lacking.17 The point is that modern copyright tends to advance a doctrinal
judgment that data are best conceived in terms of data-as-form (is
the work, as “thing,” sufficiently original?) and that such a thing-like
character is often absent. Although data often are human-created,
data are and should be difficult to capture, control, and own, because
of their obvious social value. Data might be form, but are not. In
practice, as a consequence, data are flow.
Both the data-as-form and data-as-flow constructs can be modified by
rule and by practice. Data producers and data controllers often have
recourse to alternative legal strategies, both in commercial contexts
and in research and government setting. Data-as-form approaches
are observed in access controls imposed via contract and/or via technology limitations, as well as via legislative efforts to secure forms of
exclusivity in databases that do not sound in copyright. The European
Parliament, recognizing the poor fit between copyright and databases that is illustrated in the US by the Feist standard, adopted the
so-called Database Directive in 1996. The Directive created a sui generis right to protect databases from appropriation, so long as the database in question represents a “substantial investment” of resources.18 The inadequacies of that Directive have, in part, prompted the
European Commission recently to propose a new “producer’s right’
in machine-generated data.19 Data-as-flow approaches are evident in
contract, technology, and commercial considerations combined in
“Data as a Service,” or “DAAS” arrangements. The categories are not
rigid. The key is to see how they provide a conceptual foundation for
the simultaneity of the conditions of day-to-day practice.

2.3 Public Health and Data
The second is law and public policy concerning public health and
medical research. Data about individual health conditions and treatments is collected, abstracted, and generalized both in order to build
predictive models of disease and contagion used for population-level
interventions and to build diagnostic heuristics and predictive models
used for individual-level interventions. In both settings, where models
are built and interventions applied, data-as-flow defines the practice.
Where data are obtained or generated at the level of the individual
patient or research subject, data-as-form may dominate. Data-as-form
permit researchers and clinicians to describe the individual. Dataas-form permit them to document a collection of attributes about
the individual. Data-as-form support policymakers and advocates, in
contexts that highlight privacy considerations and human rights, who
assert that, intuitively, the data “belong” to the individual because in
some respects the data originated with or in that person. Commercial interests (and some research interests) claiming “ownership” of
health-related data likewise invoke data-as-form arguments.
Legally, states have developed regulatory regimes to try to manage
these conflicts, to protect the interests of researchers, the public, and
commercial interests in generating better and more effective public
16
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health and clinical medical strategies, and also to protect the interests
of individuals in avoidable harm to interests in autonomy, privacy,
and bodily integrity.
The US has done this via the Common Rule, a formal regulatory
standard that governs ethical practice in biomedical and behavioral
research involving human subjects, when that research is conducted
(as almost all such research in the US is) with the support of federal
funding or in federally-supported institutions. It provides that identifiable individual research subjects must give consent both to their
participation in research and also to uses of associated individual
data. In effect the Common Rule interposes strong initial data-asform-based regulation on research programs animated by data-asflow considerations.
Blends of data-as-form and data-as-flow may change. The Common Rule has now been changed. As of January 2019,20 the Revised
Common Rule substantially lowers the threshold for what amounts
to “informed” content, meaning that research subjects no longer
need to be provided with detailed and comprehensive information
regarding uses to which “their” data may be put (quotation marks
are included because, given the earlier discussion of copyright, the
law may not support proprietary claims). It may be sufficient for
researchers to disclose the simple fact that individual data may be
shared. Data-as-form considerations are de-emphasized. Data-as-flow
considerations are more prominent.
The illustration suggests both that neither data-as-form nor data-asflow is necessarily superior in normative terms and also that the two
framings may be combined, as in the copyright illustration earlier, in
complex ways. Adoption of the Revised Common Rule was prompted
by the power and potential of medical and public health research
grounded in Big Data techniques, where sharing and combining data
from multiple sources is increasingly the norm.21 Critics point to
alternative legal constructions, such as the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),22 which blend individual patient
interests and commercial interests differently.23 The GDPR imposes
significantly higher informed consent requirements with respect to
storing and re-using individual health data. Normative assessment is
complicated by additional data-as-form and data-as-flow attributes of
US medical research systems. Authors of medical and public health
research may be required by US law to share their research data by
depositing data in public archives, a policy judgment based principally on data-as-flow.24
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2.4 Biobanks and Data

3.1

A third illustration of diverse and changing uses of data-as-form and
data-as-flow are biobanks, collections of biospecimens and related
data derived from and used for research in both biomedicine and
agriculture. Thousands of biobanks operate around the world storing
tissue samples, genetic sequence information, and seeds, among
other things. Their organizational structures are correspondingly
diverse. Many are state-sponsored or supported. Some are private.
Some are philanthropic. In cases where these enterprises collect and
store data and physical specimens, as many do, their organizational
design and governance and relevant legal regulation address data-asform and data-as-flow perspectives in two layers.

The concept of governance is used here in the sense of collective or
coordinated decisionmaking by individuals working together, about
decisions on matters of collective interest. The emphasis on governance, rather than on law, regulation or public policy specifically or on
coordination in the abstract, is based on and justified with respect
to a fundamental anthropological instinct rather than a formal or
positive legal one. Governance means individuals working together
to form groups to solve their own problems.27 A major thesis of this
paper is that with respect to data, we should be asking about governance, not asking simply about law. Starting with governance opens
the door to broader and more effective questioning about potential
problems and solutions associated with data. Starting with markets
or the state, per the Introduction, may pre-judge the character of
both.

One layer is biospecimens themselves, to which ethical, privacy,
contractual, and tangible property interests may attach. They are
data-as-form, in the sense of each biospecimen being a “thing,” and
a collection of biospecimens being a distinct “thing.” Biospecimens
are also data-as-flow, in that they are data as well as objects, and they
have been collected and stored precisely because of their infrastructural, informational value to future researchers. A second layer is
the informational data associated with the biospecimens, to which
independent ethical, privacy, contractual, and intangible property
interests may attach and which may have independent infrastructural
importance for future research. The informational data are likewise
data-as-form (the information associated with each specimen, and
with a collection), and data-as-flow.25

3.

About Governance

Data-as-flow and data-as-form are rhetorical and propositional
statements, but they are not pre-theoretical. They are not ontological
statements about the true state of data. They are, by virtue of their
metaphorical origins, judgments about the world, offered for their
utility. They set out the initial conceptual vocabulary of this article.
This Section provides the beginnings of its syntactical structure,
which animates the analysis. If the challenge of data governance is
identifying and advancing respects in which data-as-form should
dominate data-as-flow, or the reverse, or neither, then how should
that challenge be addressed?
This Section provides the first elements of a toolkit for analyzing situations and possibly recommending courses of action. It is a framework, which describes governance, institutions of governance, and
the knowledge commons framework as an instrument for researching
governance. Knowledge commons gets particular attention here
because it provides as systematic framework for examining governance of shared knowledge resources, and because data governance is
above all else, perhaps, a complex and sustained challenge in managing shared resources in institutional contexts.
Like a useful theory, a useful framework teaches us what conditions
matter and what to look for, and why. As a device for assembling evidence, a framework should not be overly or prematurely precise and
should initially accommodate multiple possible theories.26

3.2 Institutions
Governance is best understood via its expression in institutions,
rather than via the thoughts and behaviors of individuals. Individuals and their opportunities, thoughts, choices, and behaviors
matter and, in a utilitarian sense, often matter most in final welfare
judgments. But in practice, individual cognition and motivation are
diverse. Efforts to understand governance primarily via references to
an imaginary “model” human, responding to commands of the law,
are destined to be unsatisfactory to the extent that the models do not
match reality. This article foregrounds a framework that is grounded
in empirics and pragmatics of institutions, meaning collections of
individuals.
Governance is not limited, however, to formal institutions of the
state, such as legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies. The
reference to “institution” implies a broader view.
For a working definition of “institution,” the article adopts the definition given by the economist Douglass North: the rules of the game
of a society, devised by humans and shaping human behavior.28 Also
relevant, to similar if not identical effect, is the concept of the institution developed in modern sociology: institutions are stable behavioral
patterns that reflect the coordinated behavior of individuals and
organizations, where the relations define the actors rather than the
other way around.29
The difference between the two perspectives, the former focusing
more on rules that guide or determine patterned behavior, and the
latter focusing on rules that reflect patterned behavior, is not determinative here. What matters is that institutions in either sense (or both
senses) simultaneously produce and rely on well-understood sets of
human-created norms to determine outcomes among a group of people who significantly self-identify with the enterprise in its own time.
Groups may constitute and be denominated “communities” or “collectives” or firms or other enterprises. Membership or participation
may be small or large. Group identity may be formally circumscribed
or informal, dynamic, and fluid. Groups may exist in specific places
and times, as firms or as cities, for example. They may combine mate27
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rial and immaterial forms, transcending place and time in “imagined”
communities of the sort described by Benedict Anderson.30 Groups,
loosely specified, are critical loci of governance in institutions.31

3.3

Institutional Governance of Resources

The rest of this Section offers a framework for investigating and
understanding institutional governance of resources, including institutional governance relative to data, in ways that supplement the two
usual sources of legitimate governance, states and markets.
Perhaps the most enduring and influential justification for the roles
of markets and states in regulating resources, particularly relative
to shared resources, is the story of the tragedy of the commons.32
Modern researchers have come to identify the story closely with a
well-known paper by the ecologist Garrett Hardin from 1968, but the
story pre-dates Hardin’s work.
The tragic commons offers a powerfully simplistic metaphor. As a
result the story has been simultaneously a diagnostic tool, an explanation for historical developments, and a prescription. If resources
are shared, they are likely to be over-exploited and ruined. To prevent
the expected destruction, regulation should specify an actor or actors
responsible for a defined set of resources, accountable either via the
marketplace or via state mechanisms, and expect better results.
Legal scholars often have assimilated the tragic commons metaphor to problems in the creation and circulation of information and
knowledge, such as production of inventions, new cultural works,
management of data, personal information, and interests in privacy.
The stereotypical implication is state supply of legal exclusivities in
relevant intangibles, to be traded in private markets. Alternatively, the
state may simply supply the resource itself, directly (by building and
controlling it) or indirectly (by underwriting it). The expected solutions are intended to ensure that the resource exists in the first place,
rather than over-exploited.
The tragic commons model works well in some settings. Positive law
itself may at times be a resource that would not be adequately supplied absent state direction.33 Various jurisdictions act differently on
that institutional premise. US federal law is committed to the public
domain. Other jurisdictions assert proprietary claims over the content of the law, in the name of the state. At best, in short, the tragic
commons metaphor offers a helpful beginning. But its shortcomings
are more significant. The inadequacies of the metaphor have been
critiqued elsewhere at length. Only the briefest review is needed here.
In part, the tragic commons metaphor may mis-describe the
resources themselves, particularly as to knowledge and information
resources, such as data. The tragic commons metaphor typically posits a depletable resource. Even for tangible resources, that assumption may not hold. Material resources, even biophysical resources
such as grazing pastures, may be regenerated or resupplied. For
intangible and immaterial resources, such as data, consumption may
30

31

32

33

TechReg 2020

Tools for Data Governance

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (Verso 1983).
Michael J Madison, ‘Social Software, Groups, and Governance’ (2006)
2006 Michigan State Law Review 153.
Madelyn Sanfilippo, Brett Frischmann and Katherine Strandburg, ‘Privacy
as Commons: Case Evaluation through the Governing Knowledge Commons Framework’ (2018) 8 Journal of Information Policy 116. A ‘shared’ resource is one that is produced, used, and/or consumed by multiple actors,
either concurrently or sequentially.
Brigham Daniels, ‘Legispedia’ in Brett M Frischmann, Michael J Madison
and Katherine J Strandburg (eds), Governing Knowledge Commons (Oxford
University Press 2014).

affect their value but not their existence. They suffer from no depletability problem. One significant problem is creating data resources
in the first place, with the right attributes. Further resource-related
questions are deferred to Section 5, below.
In part, and as relevant here, the tragic commons metaphor may
mis-describe the actors involved. The tragic commons metaphor
posits self-regarding, selfish decisionmaking actors with no means or
motivation to acquire information about their neighbors’ activities, no
ability to plan for the future, no practice of coordinating their actions
with their neighbors’, and no capability for adaptation and innovation
in the face of complexity.34 The metaphor assumes no governance.
Instead, it assumes a sort of pre-governmental, pre-political state
of nature, with no background customs or rules regarding collective
identity or appropriate behaviors, and primitive, one-dimensional
individuals.
Obviously, the tragic commons metaphor is not intended generally to
describe any actual world. But it may be taken as doing so, and when
that happens, the metaphor may become something of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The failure of collective action that the metaphor predicts
may provide a premise rather than a conclusion.
One may treat the production, consumption, and preservation of
a shared resource as a challenge for collective action, rather than a
failure of collective action. Can forms of collective action solve those
challenges? Can those forms do so, particularly with respect to shared
knowledge and information resources, in ways that are as welfare-enhancing as one supposes state production, distribution, and access?

3.4 Commons Governance
The path to a pluralistic modern understanding of institutional governance and the potential strengths of resource sharing institutions
arose initially via the research of Elinor Ostrom. First collected in the
1990 book Governing the Commons,35 the work of Ostrom and her
colleagues, collaborators, and students carefully established, via an
abundance of fieldwork and comparative analysis, that self-directed
collaboration and collective action to solve resource management
problems was possible – in practice, if not always in theory. Ostrom’s
adaptation of the “commons” framing not only enlarged policymakers’ and scholars’ fields of vision relative to shared resource challenge. This work re-introduced the idea of “commons” in an explicitly
ecological sense, referring to actors, institutions, and resources
interacting in systems in multiple interdependent ways.36
In Governing the Commons and later work, Ostrom added to economists’ standard taxonomy of types of goods. Beginning with private
goods (which area excludable and rivalrous), public goods (which are
nonexcludable and nonrivalrous), and club goods (which are excludable but nonrivalrous, and sometimes referred to as toll goods), she
added and focused on “common-pool resource systems,” or “CPRs.”
CPRs are resources, rather than goods, a definition that expands
their utility and functions to include uses beyond tradeability and
consumption. CPRs are nonexcludable and shared but depletable, and
subject to risks of overconsumption.
For common-pool resources, Ostrom described a series of considerations, or guidelines, indicating when informal systems of collective,
community management of the resource was both feasible – contrary
34
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to the prediction of the tragic commons metaphor – and likely to
generate sustained, welfare-promoting provision of that resource
over time.37 The word “commons” comes forward in this article from
Ostrom’s work. “Commons” means not fully open, unmanaged
access to a resource, but instead collective institutional governance
of a resource, embodying a set of strategies that solve coordination
problems, known as social dilemmas. That mouthful of a phrase can
be distilled into something shorter: commons means groups that
engage in managed resource sharing. Institutional governance via
groups may take the place of or exist in tandem with governance via
exclusive rights and markets, (on the one hand) and governance via
state provision or determination (on the other hand).
In highlighting the possible virtues of commons-based institutional
governance of resources, Ostrom’s work is important here in three
respects.
One, Ostrom’s guidelines for successful commons management
have no direct or obvious utility in domains related to knowledge,
information, and data. Virtually all of the research conducted for
Governing the Commons and follow-on research focused on natural
(i.e., biophysical) resources, such as water systems, forests, fisheries,
and pasturage, which easily fit Ostrom’s definition of a CPR. Though
late in her career Ostrom and her colleague Charlotte Hess undertook some preliminary explorations of commons governance related
to knowledge resources,38 those efforts should be regarded more as
encouraging further investigation rather than as definitive applications of Ostrom’s work in new domains. Despite some preliminary
efforts to apply Ostrom’s work to data governance,39 shareable
knowledge, information, and data resources do not meet the definition of CPRs. In intangible, immaterial forms, knowledge resources
are neither excludable nor depletable. Ostrom’s commons guidelines should be set aside with respect to data governance. Whether
and how collective- or community-based governance of data should
function is a matter to be investigated afresh, via examining conditions in the field.40 Ostrom’s body of work exhibits a strong sympathy
for collective self-determination and a strong skepticism of the role
of the state, via formal property rights systems or otherwise. Those
intuitions deserve empirical exploration in contexts related to data.
Two, Ostrom showed that understanding and developing effective
institutional governance requires a strong dedication to empiricism
and to comparative, contextual analysis.41 Ostrom and her colleagues
were motivated in part by specific resistance to the simplistic conceptual reasoning that is often associated with casual adoption of the
tragic commons metaphor. In that spirit, Ostrom formalized her style
of research in a strategy labeled the “Institutional Analysis and Development” framework (IAD) in order to support additional research.42
37
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That style of analysis, if not that framework itself, is a critical step
forward in understanding data governance.
Three, Ostrom highlighted the broad domain of successful resource
governance strategies that rely neither on “market exclusivity” nor
“state provision of a shared resource” (a strategy that would include a
public policy declaring that a resource ought to be unowned and fully
“open,” as a part of a “public domain”). She titled the address she
delivered in association with receiving the Nobel Prize Beyond Market
and States.43

3.5

Knowledge Commons

The proposition that shared knowledge and information resources,
such as data, ought to be subject to analysis and possible regulation
via commons governance institutions of the sort just described, has
been distilled into the knowledge commons research framework.
That framework, described sometimes via the shorthand “GKC
framework” after Governing Knowledge Commons, the title of the first
volume of published knowledge commons research,44 is an analytic
tool motivated both by frustration with the tragic commons metaphor, as applied to information, and also by the strengths and style
of Ostrom’s research on commons. The GKC framework brings the
ecological and systems spirit of that research into examinations of
knowledge and information governance.
In contemporary research and policymaking, information production problems are simplistically modeled as overconsumption and
free riding by multiple actors with access to a shared knowledge
resource, leading to depletion and eventually to underproduction.
Stereotypical solutions follow, modeled either as exclusive property
rights transacted in markets (patents, copyrights), or as public goods
provisioned by or underwritten by state authorities (such as scientific research). Problems of information privacy may be subject to
equivalent stereotypical treatment, leading to proposals to vest strong
exclusive privacy rights in individuals or to empower states to define
privacy interests – to the exclusion of collectively self-directed privacy
governance, in context.45
The GKC framework animates a research program intended to capture and inventory the domain of governance problems and solutions
for knowledge and shared information resources. The GKC framework
borrows its empiricism, its emphasis on context and setting, and its
methodological pluralism from Ostrom’s IAD framework. Similarly,
the GKC framework anticipates the later development of one more
theories or models of institutional design, individual motivation, and
normative assessment. While the GKC framework is styled in the
manner of Ostrom’s IAD framework, it is not simply a special case
of Ostrom’s thinking or the IAD framework as such. Other scholars of information policy have similarly called for the development
of governance strategies based on commons concepts: structured
sharing.46
Clarifying the terminology helps to introduce the details of commons
governance as a system by which some community or collective
establishes and enforces principles of managed access to a shared
resource. The underlying resource may be “purely” intangible and
immaterial or a blend of material and immaterial attributes. The
43
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resource may be characterized by intellectual property rights and/
or other exclusivity interests. The resource may originate in information that is characterized by no IP rights (public domain status). A
patent pool and a data pool are both forms of knowledge commons,
as the term commons is used here. A newsgathering and distribution
collective, such as the Associated Press “wire” service, is a form of
knowledge commons, although individual news stories are typically
subject to few if any formal IP rights and in some countries, notably
the US, are treated as presumptively open by virtue of constitutional
requirements.47 The relationship between the legal status of the
underlying resource and the character of the resource management
system is a question to be explored, not declared. Neither ownership
nor openness is the end of the matter.
Commons governance includes a range of institutional governance
practices under the “commons” umbrella. Because knowledge and
information resources may be defined and regulated by positive
law, commons governance systems and market-based systems and
formal state regulation may be linked and overlap in specific contexts.
Further, no bright line exists to divide knowledge commons, which are
directed primarily to information resources, from other sorts of commons, such as natural resource and environmental commons studied
by Ostrom and her colleagues, and urban commons, which refer
to governance of urban planning and design.48 The acronym CPR,
which in social science research refers to “common-pool resource,”
also appears in property law theory as “common property regime,” a
commons-like governance system anchored in analyses of infrastructural resources such as roads. Common property regimes highlight
increasing returns to scale as more and more people consume a
resource of a given size.49 Infrastructural resources, because of their
shared character, are often governed as commons.50 The practice of
“commoning” usually refers to politically or ideologically-motivated
practices combining local resource governance institutions and
self-directed community governance.51
The details of the GKC framework as a research instrument are
described elsewhere.52 The key insight of the framework is not
whether the institution “is” or “is not” a commons. Rather, the
question answered by the framework is whether and how some
knowledge or information resource is governed as a shared resource
via some community or collective, as an alternative to knowledge
governance in markets, founded on claims of exclusivity of right,
such as patents or copyrights or to knowledge governance via state
intervention, provision, or subsidy. Commons governance systems
may play important roles with respect to market-based and government-supplied resources. The question is whether some knowledge
or information resource presents, in substantial part, hallmarks of

structured sharing.53
Knowledge commons governance is neither rare nor novel, nor is
it limited to specific economic or cultural niches, such as small
communities. The GKC framework supplies a means of describing
the breadth of the field in a systematic way. The functionality of
durable knowledge commons governance – broadly across technical
and cultural domains, at different scales, and in specific cases – has
been demonstrated in cases across a diverse range of contemporary
and historical settings, including both technology development and
cultural creation.54 Janis Geary and Tania Bubela provide an exemplary case study of knowledge commons in a specific and focused
case of contemporary life sciences research.55 Knowledge commons
has been used to analyze the field of microbial biology.56 The GKC
framework is consistent with research on patent pools, open source
software development, and clearinghouses57 and other institutions
for collective governance of shared resources, including data and
datasets. These have been documented in historical settings,58 in
less developed countries,59 in large-scale, critical scientific and health
related research networks,60 in large scale commercial settings,61 and
in Big Data-enabled scientific research communities.62

3.6 Rules and Norms
The GKC framework is primarily descriptive, rather than normative. It
aims to surface attributes of institutions via examination of specific
cases for potential comparative assessment, using tools borrowed
in part from social science, in part from the humanities, and in part
from law. (The framework is intended to be accessible to and usable
by researchers from each of these domains.) Users of the framework
and students of knowledge commons research often focus on the
systems of formal and informal rules, norms, customs, and practices
by which communities and collectives govern themselves and govern
relevant resources. In GKC research as in much of Ostrom’s work,
these are “rules in use,” signifying their empirical rather than normative status. For purposes of comparative institutional analysis, these
rules in use may be productively compared with rules and norms in
evidence in market-based governance systems and those prescribed
53
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in state-based regulatory settings. For students and practitioners of
data governance, the intuitive answer to “how should we regulate?”
takes the form of “these are the appropriate rules.”
In the context of knowledge governance, the temptation to prioritize
examination of the rules, empirically or normatively, may be resisted.
It risks putting the proverbial cart before the horse. The review of
commons governance shows why: commons governance is collective management of a shared resource by or in a group. The role of
the collective is largely to define its own governance system relative
to dilemmas associated with specified resources, producing a form
of institutional governance in context. This article has described
the fundamental problem of governing data sharing in terms of two
conceptions, data-as-form and data-as-flow. It argues next that understanding data governance should begin not with the rules, but instead
with two key phenomena: groups and things.

4.
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About Groups

“Groups” means formal and informal collections of people, who
identify themselves with the group (perhaps closely, perhaps loosely,
and perhaps in variable numbers over time) and who adopt and
enact practices that are aligned with the interests and identities of
the group. When knowledge commons governance research refers to
institutional governance of shared resources by self-directed communities and collectivities, it refers to groups solving social dilemmas
regarding those resources. Beyond Markets and States, the title of
Ostrom’s Nobel Prize address, is read fairly to claim that governance
by groups is an empirically valid mode of resource management.
In practice, that summary opens at least three key lines of inquiry as
conceptual matters.
The first is the most pragmatic: In a resource governance context,
does one or more groups exist that might serve as governance vehicles? How might such a group be identified, defined, and organized?
Should law or regulation be invoked to motivate or to discourage
group formation as part of an institutional governance strategy?
The second concerns the possible governance contributions by
groups. Groups might generate relevant rules, norms, and practices
on their own, such as a voluntary association, or might serve as
agents for administering and enforcing rules and norms generated
elsewhere, such as employees of a for-profit firm. Groups might serve
as collective institutions in a cognitive sense, so that the collective is
able to identify and act on information that is not equally accessible
or useful to individuals acting alone. Groups might act as loci for
interpretive practices by which society gives shape and meaning to
places and resources, as suggested in multiple traditions of Science
and Technology Studies. In each of these respects, where present,
groups may participate in resource governance practices.63
The third and most important here concerns ways in which groups
may be anchors for two especially critical conceptual foundations for
institutional governance of shared resources: trust and polycentricity.
Data governance strategies should explore both.

4.1 Trust
Trust represents the sense that trust mechanisms are critical to
cooperative arrangements.64 It also represents the sense that actual
human beings have greater capabilities for understanding and adapting to complex social and environmental challenges, and for doing

so cooperatively rather than being coerced to do, than is predicted by
tragic commons metaphors and presumptions of selfish behavior following the pursuit of rational self-interest.65 Trust may operate bilaterally, between individuals or between an individual and an institution.
Trust also operates critically among populations of individuals and
an institution. For governance by groups, social trust mechanisms
must operate at some level among the members of the group, relative
to one another and relative to the purposes of the group. It has been
argued that trust generally consists of means by which individuals
cope with the fact that others may exercise their own freedom.66 But
no single, optimal definition of trust exists.
Likewise, no single social or policy mechanism works universally to
promote trust and promote group formation, identity, durability, or
adaptability, or to undermine trust or to prevent it from forming.
Group-based resource governance may be unhelpful or harmful, or
may create unmanageable conflict with other governance institutions. The research literature on trust and cooperation is vast, and it
covers sociological, anthropological, economic, political science, and
philosophical domains.67 Emphasizing reciprocal relations between
community members, for example, is sometimes suggested as a
critical ingredient in effective cooperative settings, an idea that may
be traced back to early work on gift economies. But the details matter.
“Pay it forward” reciprocity strategies may be as important to trust
formation as “pay it back” strategies, or more so.68 Trust creation and
reinforcement may depend on relationships among group decisionmaking rules (such as enforcement norms, or exit/entry criteria) and
the development of shared collective identity (such as “who we are”
questions).
This makes trust an ecological and structural question as well as a
matter of individual cognition.69 The research and policy challenge
is to design and support institutions where the benefits of individuals’ cooperative capabilities can be put to good use, where shared
resources can be governed effectively, and where the weaknesses of
a trust-based model are minimized. Cooperative capabilities are unevenly distributed, for example, and trust mechanisms may be riddled
with harmful power and influence dynamics. Trust is itself, significantly, a shared resource, and governance of that resource is likely
necessary as part of broader resource governance strategy.

4.2 Polycentricity
That trust is a shared resource subject to governance, as part of governance of a shared knowledge resource such as data, points to the
idea that governing groups may overlap and intersect. Polycentricity
captures that concept, in the sense that any institutional design for
governance is likely to be most effective when it is characterized and
implemented in a decentered way, with multiple loci of authority and
responsibility, rather than a single center of regulatory agency, intersecting with one another at different scales70 and relying on individuals’ diverse motivations for participating.71
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Those multiple centers may be informal or formal or blends of the
two. Groups may be organized hierarchically. Smaller groups may be
“nested” within a larger group. Groups may be linked to on another
in a network of distinct and/or overlapping nodes of different scales.
Polycentric systems can be flexible and adaptable across time, scale,
and community form. They can support enforcement and accountability mechanisms at different scales, enhancing legitimacy, accountability, and administrability of governance systems as a whole.
So, just as trust is a key governance variable to be explored, polycentricity does not solve all problems. One must still carefully consider
the scope of authority and its mechanisms of accountability and legitimacy. Like all governance systems, and like trust, polycentric systems
are subject to appropriation and abuse via dynamics of power, wealth,
and status. Polycentricity is not a cure-all. It is an analytic strategy,
and polycentric systems can be made stronger and weaker.72

4.3 Groups and Data
Group-based perspectives, including polycentric governance and
emphasis on structures that both generate and rely on social trust,
are consistent with but perhaps more nuanced and potentially
effective than other norm-based approaches that are not so explicitly
pluralistic. Governance of shared data resources with reference to
groups helps us organize possible strategies distinguished as dataas-form and data-as-flow. The absence of relevant groups relative to
those data resources suggests a different range of strategies distinguished along those lines. For example, certain approaches to “open”
data governance (a species of data-as-flow) may be better appreciated
and have greater impact if described as parts of polycentric governance, including “best practices” recommendations; “fair practices”
approaches, such as the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP)
for personal data collection and the FAIR Data Principles for scientific
data management; suggestions that all of data or all of knowledge
constitutes a single, global shared resource;73 and advocacy under
labels such as Open Science and Open Data. In these contexts,
“openness” and “fair” practices are achieved by paying careful attention to institutional attributes of groups and fields.74
Historical data governance practices are similarly illuminated by prioritizing questions about groups, trust, and polycentricity. The historian Will Slauter argues persuasively that seventeenth century English
publishers strategized ways to obtain exclusivity in shipping and price
information (data-as-form).75 Modern copyright and its near-total
exclusion of data from legal ownership is in many respects a product
of those strategies, their modern analogs, and resistance by other
groups in UK and American legal systems (data-as-flow). The political
scientist James Scott suggests, provocatively, that central state
authority exists not only to enhance the well-being of citizens but to
72
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render information about them “legible,” as data (data-as-form).76 He
argues that alternatives to the modern state, in localized, collective
self-governance, may be equally effective at promoting well-being and
offers the benefit of maintaining critical distances between the state
and its subjects (data-as-flow).

5.

About Things

“Things” captures a broad range of related phenomenon: items,
units, commodities, embodiments, objects, artifacts, and stuff,
both material and immaterial, analog and digital. With such a broad
beginning, semantics and ontologies can get tricky, and interpretive
techniques must be developed to sort out relevant distinctions.77
One object may embody more than one thing, and one thing may be
embodied in more than one object. A “work of art” such as a novel
may embody a distinct “work of authorship” or “copyright work”; that
copyright work may be embodied in numerous copies of the novel.
One thing, such as a the novel, may be part of another thing, such
as a library, and may itself consist of other things, such as literary
elements, and chapters. Identity is another concern. In the larger collection, the smaller unit may be separable. But not always. A gallon of
water poured into a river mixes inseparably with the rest of the river.
A gallon of water can be extracted from the river, but that gallon is not
the same gallon as the water previously poured in. Origins, possession, and authenticity also shape the definitions, meanings, and purposes of things. Things are often associated with specific individuals.
They are also often associated with social groups.
The word “thing” is a broad and inclusive way to refer to “resource,”
as that word and concept have contributed earlier to discussions of
governance. When knowledge commons governance research refers
to institutional governance of shared resources by self-directed communities and collectivities, it refers to groups solving social dilemmas regarding the creation, use, and preservation of things, treating
things as a flexible category that allows researchers and analysts to
explore widely.
In practice, that summary opens at least two key lines of inquiry as
conceptual matters.
The first returns to the prompt with which the article began: the
essential distinction between data-as-form and data-as-flow. That distinction suggests asking, foundationally, what is a thing, and how do
we know? Whereas the last Section built conceptually on the contributions of Elinor Ostrom, to a sizable degree this Section moves beyond
Ostrom. Ostrom’s work on institutional governance and commons
typically relied heavily on analysis of natural resources, which come
to us with given and mostly unmodifiable biophysical attributes.
Ostrom’s later work, on knowledge, tended to treat “knowledge” as
a single, undifferentiated resource. Neither approach suits the GKC
framework. Neither approach suits data.
The second concerns relationships between groups and things. Those
relationships are often fundamentally ecological and systemic. The
social groups that construct and manage resources may be produced,
reinforced, and reproduced by the identity of the resource and by the
group’s governance practices relative to the resource, both as to the
internal dynamics of social groups and as to relationships between
social groups.78 How should those relationships be explained?
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What is a Thing

Identifying and defining things are problems in epistemology that
go back to Aristotle. The question here is not so broad. The question
is governance: what are the things that form parts of governance
systems? What are resource systems, and what are resource unit?
Borrowing the concept of polycentricity, how do multiple resource
systems interact, overlap, and align? Where do relevant resources
come from; how are relevant resources used, consumed, and applied;
and how, if at all, are relevant resources preserved over time? Data-asform and data-as-flow are then both inputs into governance analysis
and outcomes of governance analysis.
For biophysical resources, answers to most of these questions may
be relatively straightforward; resources are the objects of governance.
For knowledge and information resources, including data, resources
are both subject and objects of governance. Governance often creates
(produces, consumes, preserves) the things to which governance
applies. Prioritizing things in governance is a way of prioritizing a key
set of critical questions. Pragmatically, a critical perspective on governance means that little turns on classifications of things resources
as inherently private goods, public goods, club or toll goods, or common-pool resources. The tools of law and policy as well as the experiences of social life teach that boundaries and classifications among
these categories can be modified in many settings, disrupting what
otherwise might be standard prescriptions based on the logic that
gives priority attention to commons tragedies. A functional approach,
based on an empirical approach to ecologies in practice, is preferred.
Data depend on their reference and relationships to underlying
phenomena. In that sense, data are evidence of something else.79
They are, almost by definition, both things in themselves and also
versions of something else. Data signify a problem long recognized
in mathematics, computer science, geography, and literature: to be
useful, a model or map must stand in for the whole but not be identical to it.80 Data are sometimes characterized as “raw” or “cooked,” a
metaphorical framing that suggests the degree to which data directly
(raw, unprocessed) or indirectly (cooked, processed and analyzed)
relate to their source. The metaphor departs from its partial origins
in the anthropological literature, as a reference to the construction of
conceptual oppositions.81 But the allusion gets at something equally
fundamental. Both the identity and the attributes of data, databases,
and datasets, including attributes implicating exclusivity and shareability, are matters of design as well as physics or economics.

5.2 Things and Groups
Significantly, social groups are among the most fundamental “designers,” even with respect to such traditional resources as property
in land. The legal historian Molly Brady, for example, has carefully
documented that the historical meaning of the phrase “metes and
bounds” in the law of real property refers to boundaries identified by
local social and community practices, rather than to fixed boundaries

specified by surveyors.82
In domains of knowledge and information, including data, the
absence of a standard or uniform material reference (unlike land)
means that the role of social relationships in constituting things and
resources, both in social life and in legal processes, is both broader
and deeper.83 The argument draws on research in Technology Studies
and Information Science, rather than legal scholarship.84 Scholars
have researched access to immaterial goods;85 have explored governance of resources that generate additional resources (so-called “generative” phenomena);86 and explored modern technologies such as
open source computer programs, in which the group and the object
constitute each other.87
Observing that things may be constructed socially, particularly for
purposes of governance, does not imply that those processes of
construction are simple or straightforward. (Nor does it imply that
material objects do not have a physical reality.) The variability and
complexity of those processes; the possibilities that they may or may
not be linear and/or purposeful; the fact that they likely involve multiple social systems, including law; and the reality that individual actors
in those systems, even within social groups, may have conflicting
motivations, are precisely what give rise to the need to examine those
processes critically.88
In commercial law settings, for example, two actors may agree by
contract to treat a dataset as a tradeable commodity even while
formal IP law considers that same information to be unowned and
unownable. Customary practices in many fields construct domains
of things for disciplinary purposes, such as the “copy” that has been
the unit of text for both publishers and journalists. For public policy
reasons, legal institutions may declare an absence of thing-like character, in order to deprive others of the power to claim property-like
exclusivity in them. Patent law resists granting exclusive rights in laws
of nature and abstract ideas. Property scholars who are committed
to the central role of “things” in property law have begun to explore
the legal “toolkit” of doctrines and arguments needed to construct
property resources at different scales, producing an architecture of
property things.89
As noted earlier, the GKC framework for researching knowledge
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commons emphasizes how social groups develop governance to
address social dilemmas, or problems in cooperation.90 Analysis of
social dilemmas in complex settings may be simplified somewhat by
techniques of “decomposing” large systems into small components.91
Larger things may contain small things.
In sum, as to the identity of relevant resources, the possible absence
of linearity and the importance of context should be emphasized, and
over-reliance on ex ante categorization should be avoided. That point
has particular significance with respect to data. Modern research
demonstrates how scientific research consists of reciprocating processes rather than a progression from “basic knowledge” to “applied
knowledge,” including technology development and commercial
application.92 Likewise, research data production and management
is now likewise often expressed in cyclical terms.93 Data are sometimes characterized entirely as an infrastructural resource.94 That
focus highlights the many ways in which data use creates spillovers
in multiple fields, in both expected and unexpected ways. But that
infrastructural designation should be taken only as the beginning of
an examination of appropriate governance, because infrastructure
is a designed and socially constructed resource much as any other
knowledge or information resource is.95

5.3

Things and Data

One strength of the word “resource” is that it properly evokes relationships between resources in resource systems or ecologies. Awareness of data ecologies for governance analysis aligns specifically with
the emphasis that the GKC framework places on governance in broad
context. An ecological perspective requires examining interdependencies between those resources and related resources, as systems,
involving both immaterial and material attributes and evolution and
variations across scales.
Understanding ecologies of data “things” should take account of the
data collection and management practices associated with Big Data,
with special attention given to the sources of the now-standard “three
v’s” of Big Data (volume, variety, and velocity), all the way down to
hand-curated data collections. Different settings, resources, and
resource systems may call for different governance judgments as to
relevant social groups and as data-as-form and data-as-flow considerations.
Those settings and resources may include the following. The classification below is crude. Many overlaps exist among tools, products,
services, and research outputs, and multiple opportunities exist to
deploy characterizations of data-as-form and data-as-flow.
• Techniques and technologies for observation, experimentation,
data collection, association, and construction of databases and
datasets. These may include physical devices (the Internet of
Things and the Internet of Bodies) as well as digital protocols,
including computer programs, data formats, and other digital
standards) for sensing and observing, for data transmission and
communication, and for creating and managing the resulting data
collections. MapReduce is an example of a digital computing par90
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adigm for managing super-large datasets in a distributed computing environment.96
• Processes and systems of data stewardship, which emphasize
cleaning, scrubbing, normalizing, manipulating, classifying, and
maintaining data for storage, analysis, use and application.97 Data
ontologies, data schema, and data storage techniques and models
are critical to ensure both technical synthesis and interoperability
where data from multiple sources are brought together for use as
shared resources, as in data repositories or other data infrastructures.
• Analytics, interpretations, and applications. These occupy an
enormous analytic space in their own right, because “data” as governance subjects overlap with “algorithms,” “AI,” and “platforms”
as technologies and institutions for data mining strategies; pattern
analysis; and services, products, and new knowledge forms built
on those patterns, as governance subjects. As machine learning
technologies enable the automatic adjustment of data collection
practices via embedded sensors, boundaries blur between data
and AI. So-called smart machines learn from old data and collect
new data differently. Data visualization tools are critical here, as
are conceptual maps and models.98
The worlds of data may be changing and expanding so quickly, and
this three-part division of data-related resources may be so imprecise,
that it may seem unwise to advance the concept of things as a key
governance concept. Yet two brief examples illustrate how focusing
on things in governance, and particularly in commons governance of
shared data, can illuminate specific data-related challenges.
A first example comes from outside the law, in coordination challenges among social groups within a given broad field. Academic
researchers know this as the problem of coordinating across research
disciplines. Because so much scholarly research now centers on
data along with disciplinary knowledge, researchers confront new
governance challenges even within institutions long associated with
openness and sharing, such as scientific communities and research
universities. The knowledge sharing norms of medical researchers
overlap with but are also distinct from knowledge sharing norms of
engineering researchers and social work researchers, for example.
Data-as-form and data-as-flow have no consistent meanings, in
practice, across different research traditions. In part, those differences are due to different histories of those fields. In part, those
differences reflect different experiences with ethical frameworks,
such as the Common Rule mentioned earlier. With respect to making
productive uses of data, some of these differences and complexities
can be bridged via computational techniques.99 Others can addressed
by research strategies that implement “de-composability” ideas, by
building research products that interoperate in modular ways with
research products from other fields, like Lego bricks.100 But commons
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governance strategies based on flexible understandings of the natures
of research “things” provide an important set of tools, bringing these
approaches together via a systems perspective.101
A second example comes from within the law, from intellectual property law and its treatment of data. Here, the problem is that treating a
data resource as data-as-form or as data-as-flow in one IP system may
push actors to change their characterization of resources with respect
to a different system. Recently, the US Supreme Court invalidated patents on genetic sequences isolated from human genes, in Association
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.102 That ruling undercut
the power of the patentee, Myriad Genetics, to build a commercial
business around genetic testing based on identifying those sequences
in individuals. Those who supported invalidation and advocated
for eliminating patent coverage of genetic sequences cheered. This
appeared to be a win for research science, for the concept of knowledge flow, and to many, for better clinical health outcomes and public
health. Yet it appears that Myriad has adjusted its business strategy,
applying non-patent strategies to enhance the exclusivity of the pools
of research data that were used to develop the patented inventions.103
What law seems to provide in one legal domain (data-as-flow), it
seems to take away in another, at least in part (data-as-form). Similar
conflicts now exists with respect to public sector uses of DNA data
in criminal proceedings, on the one hand, and trade secrecy law, on
the other hand,104 and between public health objectives and efforts
to protect patient privacy by granting property rights in personal data
to individual patients.105 An ecological or systems approach may not
solve these specific problems, but it would allow policymakers to
anticipate them more clearly.106
It should be emphasized that thing-ness or resource forms, whether
given, designed, or constructed by law or otherwise, should not be
viewed as necessarily hostile to efforts to promote data openness and
data sharing. So long as the character and attributes of a knowledge
resource are matters of design, including legal reinforcement or
disruption of thing-ness, then the design of resources can be tailored
appropriately to relevant governance goals. Building a data repository
of shared scientific data, for example, typically requires coordination and collaboration as to technical matters (can one dataset be
combined or coordinated with another dataset as matters of code?),
as to legal matters (are enabling or disabling contracts, licenses,
covenants, and/or laws present?), and as to social, cultural, and economic matters (do libraries and archivists and research scientists and
institutional administrators each understand, appreciate, and respect
how field-specific expertise and other resources are needed to ensure
the utility and stability of the repository?).107
In conversations that embody those challenges, data-as-flow can be
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a virtue (because giant data repositories can support streams of new,
fantastic research), but it can also be a vice (because contributions of
different fields and different resources may be difficult to separately
identify and manage, in practice). With things as with groups, no panacea exists, that is, no “one size fits all” solution. Data governance
counsels taking an adaptable stance on data-as-form and data-as-flow
questions, rather than a rigid or ontological one.

6.

Looking Ahead

This article offers a conceptual toolkit for data governance that
centers on two big themes: groups and things. Those can be
combined in various ways as part of developing approaches to
governance data collection, production, storage, stewardship, and
use. Knowledge commons is proposed as a significant overarching
framework for using these tools in developing data sharing strategies,
but the tools are also relevant to understanding market-based or
state-based institutional governance. As a conceptual approach, the
pair of tools comes with few necessary payoffs or implications. For
example, stereotypical lessons such as “define resources with clarity”
or “determine boundaries regarding access and use with specificity”
may have grounding in research on natural resources by Ostrom and
others, but perspectives on knowledge and information resources
teaches that different guidance may apply in those contexts, or some
of them.108 The path forward lies as much in imaginative use of the
concepts described here as in specific rules for specific problems.
Four possible imaginative uses follow.

6.1 Examine Social Groups and Resources in Systems
Neither data governance nor knowledge commons should be implemented in a single way across all fields and domains. Large-scale initiatives to promote openness in research science, AI systems, urban
planning, public administration and law, environmental regulation,
and public health face the difficult but critical challenge of inventorying, understanding, and analyzing the technical, social and cultural,
and legal attributes of polycentric ecologies. Data governance implies
that collaboration strategies should be built out of those details.
That implication applies to private collaboratives such as the Open
Data Initiative supported by Microsoft and other technology companies,109 and to individuals and enterprises advancing the Panton
Principles, calling for open data in science.110 It applies to global
NGOs focused on forward-looking uses of data such as AI for Good,111
and private counterparts such as AI Commons112 and Open AI.113 It
applies to governments. It applies to individual firms, to universities
and research organizations, and even to individual policymakers,
researchers, data scientists, and archivists.
Relatedly, too much emphasis in developing effective and appropriate data governance may be put on traditional distinctions between
public and private enterprises and public and private goods. Similarly, too much emphasis may be put on identifying and reinforcing
distinctions between data and algorithms. Last, too much emphasis
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may be placed on the idea of data as an infrastructural resource and
on data infrastructures. None of those distinctions are unimportant.
How they are advanced, or modified, are questions for governance
discussions.

6.2 Build Pragmatic Models of Policy Problems
Data are sometimes viewed optimistically, as enabling spillover
individual and social benefits, and sometimes skeptically, as constraining individuals or imposing harms. An institutional governance
framework supplies a useful method of integrating these different and
sometimes disparate perspectives into a pragmatic, systems-based
matrix.
Efforts to “regulate” data production and use via public/private
matrixes or on a field-by-field basis have often proved to be inadequate or inflexible, because regulators, policymakers, and scholars
have too often tried to squeeze something that “looks and feels”
like an intellectual resource into the IP categories that were constructed over the course of the twentieth century for other intellectual
resources: copyright, patent, trade secrets and confidential information, and related fields such as antitrust and unfair competition, and
privacy.
Positive law is thus seen in part as providing ways of solving social
dilemmas regarding shared resources such as data, by encouraging
collaboration via supplying state subsidies for infrastructure; creating
safe harbors for commercial collaboration and exemptions from
unfair competition and antitrust charges; exempting information from
exclusionary IP regimes; offering convening and facilitation services;
and in other ways.114 Positive law is also sometimes seen as impeding
collaboration, creating social dilemmas rather than solving them.
The idea of the anti-commons, in which a social space is characterized by too many separate property claims recognized by law, is one
suggestive example.115 An approach that organizes data regulation by
traditional legal field struggles to reconcile those perspectives.
A promising model for integrating them and others, using a pragmatic approach based on a governance rubric, is the work of the political scientist Martha Finnemore and the legal scholar Duncan Hollis
on constructing “cybernorms” for global cybersecurity governance.116
They argue that managing global cybersecurity data is a systemic
and ecological problem; that it does not fit standard policy-specific
boxes for diagnoses or solutions; and that polycentric, group-based
strategies are most likely to be effective on grounds of legitimacy and
adaptability.

6.3 Expect Change, and Borrow From Experience
A pragmatic approach to data governance makes explicit that governance mechanisms must be adaptable, and they must be adaptable at
different scales (small to large, slow to fast, local to global, existing to
novel) and relative to different resources (human capabilities, social
and institutional capabilities, and technological capabilities).
That emphasis on adaptability brings out a possibly surprising feature
of governance, and in particular data governance, that focuses on
social groups and on things: its receptivity to established governance
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mechanisms, even those that long pre-date the rise of Big Data, the
internet era, or even twentieth century technology. Contemporary IP
researchers have acquired a recent interest in informal, norm-governed innovation communities,117 where formal systems of IP rights
as such seem to contribute little or not at all to developing bodies of
novel and creative work.
That interest in collective creativity can be traced back to the earliest days of research science, in the Republic of Letters and the
early Enlightenment in England, Scotland, and continental Europe.
Communities of scientific researchers formed face to face and correspondence networks, eventually becoming formalized in salons,
scientific societies, and journals. This was not the practice of formal
peer review. It was, instead, a polycentric network of social groups,
regulating itself and the contents of their contributions via a complex
system of social norms.118 That centuries-old style of knowledge commons governance has been durable, adaptable, and effective. It may
be relevant today.

6.4 Build Assessment Techniques
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to confront in designing and analyzing data governance is the question of assessment. Institutional
design is significantly a question of comparative analysis. By what
measure is one governance institution preferred to another?
Political theory, economic theory, and social theory have no shortage of answers. Social welfare analysis gives us attention to outputs
(utility, including spillovers) and to inputs (human capabilities and
capacities). Social choice theory asks us to assess the character of
processes of collective choice regarding institutional arrangements.
Should institutions aggregate or otherwise accurate reflect the
preferences of their participants? Political philosophy directs us to
ask questions about legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and protection of primary values of individual human autonomy, including
powers of self-determination regarding participation in the polity.119
For example, a data governance community that sustains itself in
coordination with the state differs from a nominally open community
that proceeds only by relying on state-sanctioned legal instruments.
Modern scientific research has the former character, given the
abundant direct support and tax benefits offered to scientific research
institutions and researchers themselves. Users of the Creative Commons licensing tool likely have the second character; mere use of a
Creative Commons license, taken alone, does not enroll the user in a
collective or community of any sort, and the license instrument itself
is a salient and near cousin of proprietary licenses.120 A group that
manages an “open” resource, such as data, entirely via legal instruments, is apt to encounter incompatibility problems. Not every open
data license defines “open” the same way.121
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Measures of experience on the ground matter. Does knowledge
commons governance work? Is governance durable and sustainable across time (generations) and space (relevant state and other
organizational boundaries and borders)? Does practice align with
relevant ideology, including relevant rhetorics, enhancing not only its
descriptive legitimacy (acceptability to the community and to society)
but also its normative claims?
The adaptability, flexibility, and even fuzziness of commons governance in information and data settings makes assessment even trickier. Stipulating that data-as-form and data-as-flow are key governance
attributes, that data may exist in multiple interpreted forms and flows
simultaneously, and that resources and groups are often engaged
in projects of producing and re-producing one another, complicates
classic governance distinctions between individuals and collectives,
people and things, and subjects and objects.

7.

Conclusion

In almost all contexts of interest for data governance purposes, data
are likely to be shared. When, how, and why to share data are governance topics. This article has argued that the fundamental yet nonetheless pragmatic governance question for data is understanding
different implications of seeing data-as-form and data-as-flow.
This is a conceptual argument. It is undoubtedly true that where law
meets technology, whether on economic grounds or social and cultural terms, rules matter. Positive law matters, along with systems of
social norms, customs, and conventions. Rights and interests matter,
and their integration into regulatory frameworks matters, too. Nonetheless, the article recommends beginning not with the rules but with
questions of institutional design, motivated by key concepts. A wellgrounded domain of research exists focusing on shared knowledge,
information, and data as objects and subjects of institutional governance. That domain is knowledge commons. Knowledge commons
analysis argues for identifying and describing relevant social groups
in which governance frameworks may be embedded, and for identifying and describing relevant resources, or things, whose form and flow
will contribute substantially to the welfare effects of the relevant data
governance systems. Those are tools for data governance.
This perspective takes an ecological or systems approach to regulatory questions, an approach in which market exclusivities and state
mandates do not provide the standard two-part regulatory framing.
Knowledge commons governance, in which data and information
resources are shared according to governance rules tied to identified
social and institutional collectives, provides a substantial third storehouse of data governance solutions.
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